

Simple security countermeasures to achieve complex behavior.

"If you think cryptography is the solution to your problem, then you don't know what your problem is."
- Peter G. Neumann

Agenda

- 1 Levels of Automation
- 2 Attack Surface
- 3 Recent Automotive Incidents
- 4 Attacks & Countermeasures
- 5 Proposed Concept Patented Solution
- 6 Conclusions
- 7 Bibliography



Levels of Automation



Driver **Assistance** in acceleration/ deceleration





Human driver monitors road and maintains steering control

Partial Automation in acceleration/ deceleration and steering





Driver responsible for monitoring and responds to system prompts Conditional Automation Steering, braking acceleration, navigation are controlled by SW





Human driver will respond appropriately to a request to intervene

High Automation Monitoring for the driving environment and controlling the driving tasks





Human driver does not respond appropriately to a request to intervene.

Full Automation Handling of all driving tasks, under any traffic and weather conditions



Level 0

Level 1

Level 2


Level 3

Level 4

Level 5



Attack surface





Recent automotive incidents

BMW ConnectedDrive

- No communication security

Tesla remote control

- Vulnerability to MIM attack;
- Autopilot takeover leads to complete remote control

Volkswagen remote control

- Exploitability of network open ports and access rights

Malware attacks

- Proof of concept research for ransomware attacks
- Crypto mining, e.g. use car ECU resources






Attacks & Countermeasures (1/3) (Physical) Tampering

- Physical access to car ECUs that allows to directly read data (e.g. flash memory)
- Rowhammer: executing a program over and over on a "row" of transistors in a computer's memory chip exploit tiny data changes in the adjacent row to gain more system access.
- Side-channel attacks (e.g. power analysis attacks)
- > Trusted Platform Module: at minimum use a hardware anchor.
- Chain-of-trust: sequential start of the next validated routine.
- Secure boot: authentic and integer boot loader/environment.
- Execution Isolation:
 - HW: Trust Zone from ARM or Trust Execution Environment
 - SW: containers, virtualization




Attacks & Countermeasures (2/3) Network Isolation






Attacks & Countermeasures (3/3) Firewall, IDS, IPS




Firewall with IDS and IPS capabilities





Security basic principles





Automotive main advantages

Predefined and known software packages:

- mostly made "in-house".
- custom made for specific needs.

> Software is not changing often:


- max. 5% changes on the entire lifecycle of the vehicle.
- mostly bugfixes for functional or safety.

Predefined and known communication matrix:


- used communication bus e.g. CAN A and Ethernet B.
- sent and received data and content.
- what function send/receive which data at what timeframe.



Simplified system diagram




Case study – flood attack





Case study – Countermeasure time constrains





Conclusions

- Abnormal system behavior detection and reaction with almost no false-positive.
- Unknown threats detection due to predefined and known monitored parameters.
- Ability to combine multiple countermeasures
- Close collaboration with the protected application.
- Resource friendly due to push-back mechanism.
- Adaptive to on-going attacks.
- Collaborative with other implementations of this system.



Bibliography

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Thank you for your kind Attention!



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